Case Studies
How the analytical posture changes the credit decision.
Long-form documentation of engagements where the methodology choice — comp set, supply disaggregation, capture-rate denominator — determined whether the deal cleared committee.
When the comp set is wrong, the underwriting is wrong.
A 142-key full-service hotel reposition. Rebuilt STR competitive set, monthly PIP ramp-up modeling, and three-level stress scenarios produced a defensible post-PIP ADR conclusion that survived examiner review.
Apparent oversupply, real undersupply.
A Florida climate-controlled self-storage acquisition. Product-type disaggregation of supply contradicted the headline square-feet-per-capita reading and unlocked SBA 7(a) credit approval.
Capture rate against the right denominator.
A workforce multifamily development tested against the NCHMA-aligned income-qualified renter pool. The corrected capture rate reframed absorption risk and resolved the lender's primary underwriting question.
Strong frontage, fragile first year.
A ground-up express tunnel on a 40,000-VPD suburban arterial. Capture rate was re-rated for traffic count, and the first-year membership ramp — not stabilized NOI — became the binding SBA 7(a) coverage test.
The submarket was full. The demand was not.
A flex-serve wash in a submarket already counting five conveyor washes inside three miles. Why washes-per-capita measured the wrong saturation, and unconverted membership demand governed the SBA 504 lease-up.
Right site, wrong machine.
An existing in-bay automatic on a corner that could carry far more volume. Why the historical cash flow measured the machine, not the demand — and what a mini-tunnel conversion unlocked under SBA 7(a).
The market was full of weddings. The calendar only held forty Saturdays.
A ground-up rural wedding venue. Why finite prime-date inventory and utilization (RevPAS), not the size of the regional market, governed the USDA Business & Industry coverage.
Underwritten on the rental rate. Bankable on the package.
A vineyard event venue acquisition. Why the business model — space-only vs. bundled vs. all-inclusive — and not the rental fee, set per-event revenue and the SBA 504 coverage.
The new-build pro forma missed the cheaper, better-located asset.
A build-versus-convert decision for an event venue. Why an adaptive-reuse conversion won on basis and location, with conditional-use zoning as the binding risk under SBA 7(a).
The plant could make the volume. The volume couldn't make the margin.
A 30-barrel production microbrewery. Why channel mix — taproom vs. distribution margin — and not production volume, governed SBA 7(a) coverage in a contracting craft beer market.
The bigger brewhouse looked like the safer bet. The smaller one carried the loan.
A taproom-first brewery acquisition. Why utilization and capital efficiency, not installed capacity, drove returns and SBA 504 coverage.
The town was too small. The trade area and the program weren't.
A rural brewpub. Why drive-time trade area, not the town's population, sized demand — and how USDA B&I structure carried the rural risk.
The center was full. The infant rooms were why it lost money.
An infant-heavy child care center. Why room-level contribution and the age mix, not center-level occupancy, governed the SBA 7(a) coverage.
The license said a hundred and fifty children. The cash flow said far fewer.
A large child care center acquisition. Why licensed capacity is a ceiling, not a forecast, and what effective capacity actually supports under SBA 504.
The county was full of daycares. It was still a child care desert.
A rural child care center. Why the child care gap — children with working parents per licensed slot within drive-time — not visible supply, sized USDA B&I demand.
The pumps moved the most fuel in the county. The margin was inside the store.
A high-volume fuel station. Why net fuel contribution and inside-sales mix, not gallons, governed SBA 7(a) coverage.
The P&L was clean. The risk was four feet underground.
A clean-cash-flowing c-store acquisition. Why the underground storage tanks, not the income statement, gated the SBA 504 deal.
Sixty thousand cars a day. Most of them drove past.
A rural highway fuel station. Why traffic count is not capture, and a long fuel history is not a long fuel future under USDA B&I.
The top line was the best on the block. The bottom line never showed up.
A high-revenue independent full-service concept. Why prime cost and occupancy, not revenue, governed SBA 7(a) coverage.
The disclosure showed a two-million-dollar average. Most units never reached it.
A single-unit franchise acquisition. Why the brand's average unit volume was not this borrower's forecast under SBA 7(a).
Building new looked like the premium option. The used kitchen was the bankable one.
A fast-casual expansion. Why a second-generation conversion outranked a ground-up owner-occupied build on coverage.
The steadiest income in the market. The one mix the loan couldn't accept.
A long-term-dominant RV park. Why the most stable revenue mix risked SBA ineligibility, and what structure qualified.
Sixty percent occupied, and still short in February.
A northern seasonal park. Why annual-average occupancy hid the monthly cash-flow timing that carried USDA B&I coverage.
A hundred sites on paper. Forty the big rigs could use.
An older park repositioned. Why nominal site count overstated capacity, and a 50-amp pull-through conversion unlocked it under SBA 504.
The brand average made the deal. The franchise bill and the renovation unmade it.
A reflagged limited-service hotel. Why franchise fees and a brand-mandated PIP, not the brand average, decided coverage under SBA 504.
It beat its comp set every month. The comp set was the wrong one.
A select-service hotel. Why a RevPAR index above its competitive set did not mean it covered debt under SBA 7(a).
The facility was ninety percent full. The money said seventy.
A stabilized self-storage acquisition. Why economic occupancy and collected rent, not physical occupancy, carried SBA 7(a) coverage.
The market had room for the building. The pro forma didn't have time.
A ground-up self-storage development. Why the absorption curve and the interest reserve, not the trade-area demand, decided an SBA 504 deal.
The seller's expenses were a snapshot from before the sale. The deal had to live with the ones after.
A stabilized apartment acquisition. Why reassessed taxes and repriced insurance, not the seller's history, carried a HUD 223(f) loan.
The submarket was full. The pipeline wasn't finished.
A ground-up apartment development. Why the forward delivery wave, not current submarket occupancy, decided a HUD 221(d)(4) deal.
Thousands of cost-burdened renters. Only so many the project could capture.
An affordable housing development. Why the capture rate against a defined eligible pool, not the affordability gap, decides a LIHTC allocation.
The building was full of paying residents. Half the value walked in and out the front door.
A memory care community. Why the going-concern split, not a real-estate per-unit value, set what a HUD 232 loan is secured by.
The rate sheet looked strong. The schedule that filled the building set the margin.
A memory care community. Why acuity-based staffing and labor cost, not the rate sheet, set the margin.
The market had ten thousand people old enough. Far fewer who could pay.
An assisted living development. Why income-qualified penetration, not the age-qualified population, carried the demand.
The plant was worth more full than the building could ever sell for empty.
An owner-occupied cold storage facility. Why the dark value of a special-purpose building, not its going-concern value, set the collateral behind an SBA 504 loan.
The country was short on warehouses. The submarket had built too many.
An investor distribution building. Why submarket deliveries and absorption, not the national headline, set the rents on a conventional deal.
The buildings on the lot were worth almost nothing. The lot was worth everything.
An industrial outdoor storage property. Why the land and its entitlement, not the improvements, carried a conventional deal.
The two buildings rented for the same number. They were not the same asset.
An investor medical office building. Why tenant credit, lease term, location, and structure, not the use label, set the value.
The surgery center cost a fortune to build. That was the problem, not the proof.
An owner-occupied ambulatory surgery center. Why the dark value of a special-purpose facility, not its as-built cost, set the collateral.
The collateral was the building. The loan was really on the practice.
An owner-occupied physician practice building. Why the practice's cash flow and reimbursement exposure, not the real estate alone, carried the deal.