US grain storage surplus fell to 5% in 2025 — the tightest since 1988 — with a 184 million bushel national deficit heading into harvest. And when Hansen-Mueller filed Chapter 11 that November, taking nine elevators and 30 million bushels of capacity with it, the cause was roughly $39.5 million of losses on ventures outside grain trading. Capacity is genuinely tight. It is not what kills elevators, and a feasibility study that treats storage as the question has asked the wrong one.
The capacity picture, and why it misleads
Storage capacity has stopped growing.
Per USDA NASS, on-farm capacity stood at 13.63 billion bushels and off-farm at 11.85 billion bushels as of 1 December 2024 — 25.48 billion in total, up just 35 million bushels, or 0.1%, from 2023. Off-farm reached 11.9 billion bushels by 1 December 2025, up less than 1%.
Capacity grew roughly 350 million bushels a year from 2000 to 2019. It has been flat since 2020.
Meanwhile production kept climbing. The University of Illinois farmdoc analysis published in February 2026 found surplus aggregate capacity had fallen to just 5% in 2025 — against a 15% average since 2000 — with the observation that "crop production is closer to total capacity this year than any since 1988."
On-farm utilisation hit 80% at 1 December 2025, against 65% off-farm.
And the deficit is local rather than national. USDA AMS estimated a 184 million bushel national storage deficit heading into autumn 2025 — the largest since 2016 — concentrated in Iowa at negative 390 million bushels, Kansas at negative 320, South Dakota at negative 318, North Dakota at negative 310, Nebraska at negative 257 and Minnesota at negative 205.
So the honest reading is that aggregate capacity is near-adequate nationally, deficit locally, and the binding strain is on handling and transportation throughput rather than static storage.
That distinction determines what a feasibility study should actually measure, and it is where most grain facility projections go wrong.
The market in 2026
Production. USDA forecast the 2025 corn crop at a record approximately 16.7 billion bushels — 16.74 billion in the August 2025 WASDE, around 16.75 in November, having first been pegged at 15.82 billion on 181 bushels an acre in the May 2025 WASDE. Soybeans came in just under the 4.46 billion bushel record.
For 2026, USDA's February Agricultural Outlook projected corn at 15.8 billion bushels on 94.0 million acres and a 183 bushel trend yield, down roughly 7% year over year; the May 2026 WASDE put it nearer 16.0 billion bushels on 95.3 million acres. The NASS Acreage report of 30 June 2026 confirmed 95.343 million corn acres, 85.365 million soybean acres and 42.740 million wheat acres.
All-wheat 2025/26 production ran approximately 1,921 million bushels, and the first 2026/27 winter wheat forecast fell 25% to 1,048 million bushels on sharply lower Hard Red Winter output.
Note that these are forecasts. The February and May 2026 corn estimates differ by 200 million bushels, and both predate the growing season's weather.
Stocks. The NASS Grain Stocks report of 30 June 2026:
- Corn: 5.29 billion bushels in all positions, up 14% — 2.96 billion on-farm, up 16%, and 2.34 billion off-farm, up 12%
- Soybeans: 1.06 billion bushels, up 5% — 367 million on-farm, down 11%, and 694 million off-farm, up 16%
- All wheat: 920 million bushels, up 8%
One detail in that data is worth reading twice. On-farm soybean stocks fell 11% while off-farm rose 16%. Producers sold beans and held corn — a behavioural signal about where they see carry and where they see risk.
Prices and carry. As of early August 2026, corn futures traded around $4.40 to $4.50 — reaching a nine-week high near $4.50 on 24 July before easing — and soybeans near $11.50 for September and $11.75 for November. The June 2026 WASDE season-average farm prices were $4.20 for corn and $10.25 for soybeans.
The soybean forward curve in mid-2026 showed slight front-month firmness with a clear discount into 2028 and 2029 — a soft carry structure. Corn and wheat have historically traded in structural contango thanks to well-developed storage; soybeans more often show backwardation.
Carry exists but it is thin. A feasibility study should not assume the market will consistently pay a storer to hold grain, and a model built on capturing full carry is modelling something the current curve does not offer.
Producers cannot easily self-fund
This matters because it determines who is actually going to build storage.
USDA ERS forecast 2026 net farm income at $153.4 billion, down $1.2 billion nominally and $4.1 billion, or 2.6%, in real terms against 2025. USDA also sharply cut its 2025 net cash income estimate to $153.9 billion — down roughly $27 billion from its September figure.
Total farm debt is forecast to rise 5.2% to $624.7 billion in 2026, with interest expense at a record approximately $33 billion — around $90 million a day.
Crop producers face a fourth consecutive year of negative margins, with production cost around $5 a bushel for corn against roughly $4.20 in price.
An American Farm Bureau Federation survey of more than 5,700 farmers conducted 3 to 11 April 2026 found 70% could not afford all the fertiliser they needed for 2026 — rising to 78% in the South — and 94% said their finances had worsened or stayed the same.
Chapter 12 farm bankruptcy filings rose 46% to 315 in 2025, the highest since 2020, per US Courts data.
Which is precisely why FSFL demand and USDA-guaranteed financing matter, and why a study assuming producer equity contribution should test that assumption against the specific operation's balance sheet rather than sector averages.
Demand: one risk and one anchor
China is the risk. China halted US soybean purchases from late May or June 2025 through late October 2025, resuming after the meeting of 30 October. US soybean exports to China fell to $3 billion in 2025 — the lowest since 2018 — with full-year shipments around 16.8 million metric tons, down 24.1%.
The subsequent agreement commits China to 12 million metric tons in late 2025 and at least 25 million metric tons annually through 2028. But 25 million metric tons is still roughly 14% below the 2020 to 2024 five-year average of 29 million.
And Brazil took a record 73.6% of China's 2025 soybean imports, out of a record 111.82 million metric ton total.
Soybean throughput assumptions carry structural export risk that corn assumptions do not.
Ethanol is the anchor. Production reached approximately 16.49 billion gallons in 2025, and more than a third of US corn goes to ethanol. EPA set record 2026 and 2027 Renewable Volume Obligations, holding conventional corn ethanol at 15 billion gallons, and did not finalise import-RIN restrictions, deferring them to approximately 2028.
Year-round E15 legislation — H.R. 1346 and farm bill amendment 289 — was moving through Congress in 2026 with backing from the American Petroleum Institute, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Renewable Fuels Association, Growth Energy and the National Corn Growers Association. AFBF estimates permanent E15 could add approximately 2.4 billion bushels of annual corn demand.
45Z clean fuel credit guidance remained incomplete.
Net: corn merchandising is more defensible than soybean merchandising in 2026, and a facility's crop mix materially changes its risk profile.
Routing the financing
The first question is not what the project costs. It is who owns the grain and why — because that determines which programme applies, and the answer is binary.
On-farm: Farm Storage Facility Loans
FSFL is a producer tool, not a commercial elevator tool. Confusing the two is the most common structural error in this asset class.
Current terms:
- Up to $500,000 per loan for storage facilities
- $100,000 for storage and handling trucks
- 15% minimum down payment
- Terms of 3, 7, 10 or 12 years depending on amount
- Fixed rates set to the Commodity Credit Corporation's Treasury borrowing cost
Since May 2000 the programme has issued more than 33,000 loans, adding approximately 900 million bushels of on-farm capacity and financing over 40,000 equipment purchases. It marked its 25th anniversary in 2025.
Eligible items are broader than most producers realise: grain bins; drying and handling equipment, with or without a storage facility loan; aeration and quality monitoring equipment; concrete foundations, aprons and pits; portable or permanently affixed structures; and cold storage. Eligible commodities span grains, oilseeds, pulses, hay, hemp, honey, dairy, eggs and unprocessed meat and poultry.
The microloan option covers up to $50,000 at 5% down and waives the three-year production history requirement — which makes it the natural route for a beginning operation.
Applicants demonstrate storage need from production history and are subject to adjusted gross income limits under CCC-927 and CCC-928. FSFL takes a security interest and lien on the financed facility and can generally be combined with other financing.
Commercial: USDA Business and Industry
Under the OneRD framework, FY2026 B&I guarantees run 85% for loans under $5 million and 80% at $5 million and above, typically up to $25 million, and higher with Secretary approval. The annual renewal fee is 0.55% of outstanding principal.
Eligible lenders include banks, Farm Credit institutions with direct lending authority, credit unions and approved non-regulated lenders. Eligible borrowers include for-profit and non-profit businesses, cooperatives and tribes.
One eligibility nuance: agricultural production is eligible only where it is vertically integrated and ineligible for FSA farm loan programmes. Grain elevators and warehousing generally qualify as rural businesses in their own right.
Borrowers need approximately 10% equity.
And USDA requires a feasibility study for B&I projects involving new businesses, significant expansions, or where historical performance cannot demonstrate repayment — which covers most greenfield and expansion elevator work.
On REAP: grants were frozen in early 2025, with approximately $911 million obligated, partially released from 26 March 2025, then paused again while USDA rewrites the rule. Guaranteed loans remain available. The REAP grant route for grain dryer subsidy is effectively unavailable in 2026 and should not appear in a base case pro forma.
SBA, and a provision that names this industry
Two NAICS codes matter, and they are not interchangeable:
424510, Grain and Field Bean Merchant Wholesalers — elevators where storage is incidental to sales.
493130, Farm Product Warehousing and Storage — elevators primarily engaged in storage.
SOP 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025 with technical updates on 1 March 2026, restored pre-2021 underwriting rigour: the 7(a) small loan maximum fell from $500,000 to $350,000, the $250,000 threshold for outside business valuations was reaffirmed, and special-purpose property appraisal requirements tightened to USPAP-compliant work by experienced appraisers.
And it contains a provision that names this industry directly, which is unusual and worth quoting:
SOP 50 10 8 lists "a business, such as a grain elevator, that uses a commodity contract to lock in a price" as a non-speculative, eligible business — expressly distinguishing legitimate hedging from speculative commodity trading, which is ineligible.
That is the bright line lenders apply. Hedged grain is bankable. Open positions are not.
A grain elevator is generally treated as special-purpose or limited-market property, which under the SOP means the feasibility study must demonstrate market depth and re-use risk directly rather than lean on the appraisal.
On loan performance, an honest limitation. Granular per-NAICS charge-off rates for 424510 and 493130 are not freely published. The authoritative source is the Coleman Report and Lumos SBA NAICS Loan Performance product, reporting a ten-year failure rate on FY2011 to FY2020 loans, where SBA failure means the guaranty was honoured and paid.
Portfolio-wide context: analysis of 1.28 million resolved 7(a) loans from 1992 to 2025 puts the average lifetime default rate at 15.8% with an average loan around $374,000. Transportation and Warehousing shows among the highest active-book annualised default rates at approximately 7.6% in the first half of FY2026 — on a different denominator, and the two figures must not be compared directly. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting represents approximately 2% of cumulative 7(a) approvals, around $9.4 billion.
One programme development worth knowing. In June 2026 the SBA extended a grocery guarantee — a 90% International Trade Loan guarantee against the standard 75% on 7(a) — to a range of agricultural NAICS codes including farm warehousing and cold storage.
And for owner-occupied warehouses, SBA 504 at the 50/40/10 structure with approximately 10% equity is frequently cheaper than 7(a), and 504 historically charges off far less.
The revenue model, and the distinction that decides the credit
Commercial elevator revenue divides into two categories that behave completely differently.
Space income — storage fees, drying charges, handling and elevation, blending. Fee for service, relatively stable, and directly tied to throughput.
Merchandising income — basis trading, carry capture, the margin between buy and sell. Volatile, and if unhedged, effectively speculative.
A defensible feasibility study underwrites space income and treats merchandising as upside. That is not conservatism for its own sake — it is what the failure record supports, and it is what the SOP's hedging language implies.
Current benchmarks
Drying: approximately $0.04 to $0.05 per point of moisture per wet bushel, with higher charges at extreme moisture. Topflight Grain Cooperative's published schedule illustrates the structure: 5 cents per point from 15.1% to 19%, 4 cents from 19.1% to 24%, and 3.5 cents above 24%, with 1.4% shrink per point.
Storage: approximately 5 cents per bushel per month, or a flat seasonal rate — Ladd Elevator's soybean schedule shows roughly 25 cents flat to 1 January.
Shrink factors of 1.4% to 1.5% per point.
Handling shows steep scale economies, per Kenkel at Oklahoma State: approximately $0.27 per bushel at 1.75 million bushels of annual throughput, falling to approximately $0.073 per bushel at 17.5 million.
That is a nearly four-to-one cost advantage for scale, and it is the clearest argument in the data for why sub-scale independent elevators struggle.
Country elevators supplement with agronomy, fertiliser and input sales, plus grain bank and warehouse receipt arrangements — and those ancillary lines frequently carry the margin that storage alone does not.
Construction, throughput and the shuttle question
Construction cost. On-farm steel bins run $2.00 to $5.50 per bushel installed in 2026, with full grain centres — bin, dryer floor, fans, unload and concrete — at $4.50 to $5.50 per bushel.
Steel tariffs raised galvanised sheet prices in 2026, with some Midwest dealers reporting increases of 5% or more.
Commercial slip-form concrete shuttle facilities of 1.5 to 3 million bushels have cost around $25 million. That figure derives from a 2014 industry benchmark indexed forward, and current concrete and steel pricing likely pushes it higher — treat it as a floor rather than an estimate.
Throughput matters more than capacity
This is the operational corollary of the capacity point, and it is where the capital actually goes.
A modern shuttle facility receives 60,000 or more bushels an hour — typically three legs at 20,000 each — and loads a 110-car shuttle at up to 100,000 bushels an hour, targeting 17 to 20 million bushels of annual load-out.
One working example: Midwest Farmers Cooperative at Syracuse, Nebraska loads 110 cars in 7.5 hours at 65,000 bushels an hour.
Dryers of 7,000 to 14,000 bushels an hour dry to approximately 15% to 15.5% for loading.
The shuttle economics, stated plainly
Shuttle economics turn on the railroad's 15-hour loading window.
BNSF's Origin Efficiency Program, under Tariff BNSF 4022, Item 13500, pays incentives for a 15-hour load. Unit train rates run 15% to 30% below single-car rates — potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars per train cycle. Rail incentive literature from Sarmiento and Wilson cites incentives of up to $500 per car.
The requirements are substantial: approximately 1.5 miles of loop track, 12,000 or more tons of capacity, and the ability to load 110 cars within 24 hours.
And here is the risk that belongs in the study rather than the appendix. The capital only pencils if throughput and rail service are both reliable. A 110-car spot with poor car supply is a stranded asset — roughly $25 million of concrete that cannot generate the incentive revenue it was built to capture.
A feasibility study proposing shuttle capacity without a service commitment and a car supply assumption stress-tested to a bad year has not tested the thing that determines the outcome.
Regulatory, bonding and the indemnity gap
Grain warehousing is regulated state by state. There is no uniform federal licensing requirement.
States impose warehouse and dealer licensing, net worth minimums, bonding or letters of credit, and insurance requirements — Iowa operates a tiered bond scale with a $3,000 minimum; Illinois regulates under 240 ILCS 40.
Federal licensing is available under the US Warehouse Act, administered by USDA. Federally licensed warehouses are bonded under federal terms and sit outside state indemnity coverage — which is a consequential distinction for producers delivering to them.
The indemnity funds are a partial backstop
This is the producer-side risk that a feasibility study should surface, because it affects the trust a new facility can command.
Iowa pays up to 90% to a maximum of $400,000 per claimant, with credit-sale contracts less protected.
Illinois covers up to $1 million per farmer — and went broke in 2001, paying approximately $32 million.
Minnesota only recently created a fund at $15 million, replenished by a 0.02% premium when it falls below $9 million — and it faced its first major test with the Hansen-Mueller failure in November 2025.
These funds have repeatedly been overwhelmed. After Global Processing's failure in 2021 and 2022, one farmer submitted $800,000 in claims and received $60,000. Iowa's fund fell to $312,000, below its then $3 million minimum, triggering a per-bushel assessment; the legislature has since raised the lower boundary to $8 million.
Which explains why lenders view unhedged inventory as a red flag. The SOP's hedging language exists precisely because price-locked grain is bankable while open positions are not — and the indemnity record shows what happens downstream when an elevator's positions go wrong.
Safety and insurance
Purdue's 2024 summary of US agricultural confined space-related injuries and fatalities documented 51 total cases, down 7% from 2023, including 34 grain entrapments, up from 27 in 2023, and 22 fatal cases, below the five-year average of 26. The cumulative PACSID database holds 2,429 cases from 1962 to 2024.
Purdue's 2024 dust explosion report, from Professor Kingsly Ambrose, counted 9 US grain dust explosions with 2 injuries and no fatalities, against a ten-year average of 8.6 a year — across four feed mills, three grain elevators, one ethanol plant and one corn processing plant.
OSHA's Grain Handling Standard at 29 CFR 1910.272, effective 1988, has historically been the single most-cited standard for grain employers — approximately 20% of citations in a 2015 tally, ahead of electrical wiring at 11% and powered industrial trucks at 8%.
That citation figure is 2015 vintage and is the most recent quantified breakdown available; a current-year figure would require pulling OSHA enforcement data directly.
Dust explosion and confined space exposure drive both insurance cost and enforcement risk, and a feasibility study should budget explicitly for aeration, temperature monitoring and engulfment prevention systems rather than treating them as incidental.
Where grain elevator projects fail
The documented pattern is unambiguous: failures come from merchandising and diversification losses, not from storage fundamentals.
Hansen-Mueller is the case study. The Omaha company filed Chapter 11 on 17 November 2025 — nine elevators and 30 million bushels of capacity.
Per the declaration of chief restructuring officer Michael Compton, filed in the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska, Case No. 25-81226, the company lost approximately $39.5 million on ventures outside grain trading:
- A pasta plant sold for a $15 million loss in 2022
- Approximately $11 million in abandoned trading software
- Approximately $10 million on eight elevator acquisitions
It left creditors across 34 states — 128 in Kansas, 87 in Nebraska — and tested multiple state indemnity funds. The Nebraska Public Service Commission had already suspended its trading licence for failing to pay more than $2 million to farmers.
Earlier failures followed the same logic: Pipeline Foods in 2021, Global Processing in 2021 and 2022, B&B Farm Store in 2022, and Salamonie Mills in Indiana. Thin margins plus a merchandising or governance failure.
The common projection errors
Assuming full capacity utilisation.
Treating merchandising margin as recurring base-case income.
Underestimating working capital swings when grain values spike — a facility carrying inventory through a price rally needs more cash, not less.
Over-crediting rail incentives that depend on car supply.
And on scale: the handling cost data shows a near four-to-one advantage from 1.75 million to 17.5 million bushels of throughput. Scale helps. But scale pursued through debt-funded diversification is exactly what killed Hansen-Mueller — which is a different thing from scale achieved through throughput.
What a lender is reading for
Which programme applies, and does the structure match it? FSFL for on-farm producer storage; B&I or SBA for commercial. The routing question comes first.
Is the revenue split between space income and merchandising, with coverage attributed to the former?
What is the hedging policy, and is it documented? Given the SOP names grain elevators specifically on this point, an undocumented policy is a straightforward decline.
What throughput is assumed, and what does handling cost per bushel look like at that volume?
If rail is in the capital budget, is there a service commitment? And has car supply been stress-tested?
What is the state licensing, bonding and indemnity position?
Has working capital been sized for a price rally rather than a normal year?
And has the safety capital been budgeted — aeration, monitoring, engulfment prevention — rather than assumed.
Frequently asked questions
Is US grain storage capacity adequate?
Nationally near-adequate, locally deficit. Surplus aggregate capacity fell to just 5% in 2025 against a 15% average since 2000 — the tightest since 1988 — and USDA AMS estimated a 184 million bushel national deficit heading into that autumn, concentrated in Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska and Minnesota. Capacity growth has been flat since 2020 after adding roughly 350 million bushels a year from 2000 to 2019.
What is the difference between FSFL and B&I financing?
FSFL is a producer tool for on-farm storage — up to $500,000 at 15% down on 3 to 12 year terms at Treasury-linked fixed rates, with a microloan option up to $50,000 at 5% down. B&I is the commercial route, guaranteeing 85% of loans under $5 million and 80% at $5 million and above in FY2026, up to $25 million, requiring approximately 10% borrower equity. Confusing the two is the most common structural error in grain facility financing.
What can a Farm Storage Facility Loan pay for?
Grain bins, drying and handling equipment with or without a storage facility loan, aeration and quality monitoring equipment, concrete foundations, aprons and pits, portable or permanently affixed structures, and cold storage. Eligible commodities extend well beyond grain to pulses, hay, hemp, honey, dairy, eggs and unprocessed meat and poultry.
Does the SBA lend to grain elevators?
Yes, and SOP 50 10 8 names the industry directly. It lists "a business, such as a grain elevator, that uses a commodity contract to lock in a price" as non-speculative and eligible, expressly distinguishing legitimate hedging from speculative commodity trading, which is ineligible. Hedged grain is bankable; open positions are not.
Are grain elevators special-purpose property?
Generally yes, which under SOP 50 10 8 means the feasibility study must demonstrate market depth and re-use risk directly rather than relying on the appraisal, and the appraisal itself must be USPAP-compliant work by an experienced appraiser.
What do commercial elevators charge for drying and storage?
Drying runs approximately 4 to 5 cents per point of moisture per wet bushel, higher at extreme moisture — one published schedule shows 5 cents per point from 15.1% to 19%, 4 cents from 19.1% to 24% and 3.5 cents above 24%, with 1.4% shrink per point. Storage runs approximately 5 cents per bushel per month or a flat seasonal rate.
How much does scale matter in grain handling?
Substantially. Handling cost falls from approximately $0.27 per bushel at 1.75 million bushels of annual throughput to approximately $0.073 at 17.5 million — close to a four-to-one advantage. This is the clearest argument in the data for why sub-scale independent elevators struggle against cooperatives and integrators.
What does grain storage cost to build?
On-farm steel bins run $2.00 to $5.50 per bushel installed in 2026, with full grain centres including dryer floor, fans, unload and concrete at $4.50 to $5.50. Commercial slip-form concrete shuttle facilities of 1.5 to 3 million bushels have cost around $25 million, though that derives from a 2014 benchmark indexed forward and should be treated as a floor given current steel and concrete pricing.
Is rail access worth the capital?
Only with reliable service. Unit train rates run 15% to 30% below single-car rates and BNSF's Origin Efficiency Program pays incentives for a 15-hour load, with rail incentive literature citing up to $500 per car. But the facility needs roughly 1.5 miles of loop track and the ability to load 110 cars within 24 hours, targeting 17 to 20 million bushels of annual load-out. A 110-car spot with poor car supply is a stranded asset.
Why do grain elevators actually fail?
Merchandising and diversification losses, not storage economics. Hansen-Mueller's Chapter 11 in November 2025 — nine elevators, 30 million bushels — traced to approximately $39.5 million of losses on ventures outside grain trading, including a pasta plant sold at a $15 million loss, around $11 million in abandoned trading software and around $10 million on acquisitions. Earlier failures at Pipeline Foods, Global Processing, B&B Farm Store and Salamonie Mills followed the same pattern.
Do state grain indemnity funds protect producers?
Partially, and they have repeatedly been overwhelmed. Iowa pays up to 90% to a maximum of $400,000 per claimant; Illinois covers up to $1 million per farmer and went broke in 2001 paying approximately $32 million; Minnesota's $15 million fund faced its first major test with Hansen-Mueller. After Global Processing failed, one farmer submitted $800,000 in claims and received $60,000, while Iowa's fund fell to $312,000.
Are REAP grants available for grain dryers?
Not currently. REAP grants were frozen in early 2025, partially released from 26 March 2025, and then paused again while USDA rewrites the rule. Guaranteed loans remain available, but the grant route for dryer subsidy is effectively unavailable in 2026 and should not appear in a base case.
Does the market currently pay to store grain?
Thinly. Corn and wheat have historically traded in structural contango thanks to well-developed storage, while soybeans more often show backwardation — and the mid-2026 soybean curve showed slight front-month firmness with a clear discount into 2028 and 2029. Carry exists but a model built on capturing it fully is modelling something the current curve does not offer.
Sources
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service — Grain Stocks report, 30 June 2026; Acreage report, 30 June 2026; grain storage capacity data as at 1 December 2024 and 1 December 2025.
Janzen, University of Illinois farmdoc daily, February 2026, on US grain storage capacity growth.
USDA Agricultural Marketing Service storage deficit estimates, autumn 2025.
USDA World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, May 2025, August 2025, November 2025, May 2026 and June 2026; USDA Agricultural Outlook, February 2026.
USDA Economic Research Service farm income forecasts, 2025 and 2026.
American Farm Bureau Federation farmer survey, 3 to 11 April 2026; AFBF E15 demand analysis.
US Courts Chapter 12 farm bankruptcy filings data, 2025.
USDA Farm Service Agency Farm Storage Facility Loan programme materials, including CCC-927 and CCC-928.
USDA Rural Development Business and Industry Guaranteed Loan Program FY2026 terms; Rural Energy for America Program announcements, 2025 and 2026.
SBA Standard Operating Procedure 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025, technical updates 1 March 2026; SBA International Trade Loan guarantee extension, June 2026.
SBA loan disclosure data as analysed by Coleman Report and Lumos; portfolio-wide resolved-loan analysis, 1992 to 2025.
Kenkel, Oklahoma State University, grain handling cost analysis.
Published elevator rate schedules including Topflight Grain Cooperative and Ladd Elevator.
BNSF Tariff 4022, Item 13500, Origin Efficiency Program; Sarmiento and Wilson rail incentive research.
Midwest Farmers Cooperative, Syracuse, Nebraska, facility specifications.
Iowa, Illinois and Minnesota grain indemnity fund statutes and administration records; 240 ILCS 40; US Warehouse Act.
In re Hansen-Mueller, US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska, Case No. 25-81226, declaration of Michael Compton, 17 November 2025; Nebraska Public Service Commission licence action.
Purdue University, 2024 Summary of US Agricultural Confined Space-Related Injuries and Fatalities, and 2024 grain dust explosion report by Professor Kingsly Ambrose; PACSID database.
OSHA Grain Handling Standard, 29 CFR 1910.272, and enforcement citation data.
US Environmental Protection Agency Renewable Volume Obligations for 2026 and 2027.
Prepared by feasibility-study-consultant.com. Futures prices cited reflect early August 2026 and move daily; season-average farm prices are from the June 2026 WASDE and will be revised. Basis figures are regional and should be re-pulled locally before any pro forma. 2026 crop figures are forecasts rather than harvested results, and the February and May 2026 corn estimates differ materially. Per-NAICS SBA loan and charge-off data for grain and field bean merchant wholesalers and farm product warehousing is not freely published and none is asserted here; the portfolio-wide figures cited use different denominators — resolved-loan lifetime against active-book annualised — and must not be compared directly. The OSHA citation share cited is 2015 vintage and is the most recent quantified breakdown located. The commercial shuttle facility cost derives from a 2014 industry benchmark indexed forward and should be treated as a floor. Construction cost per bushel ranges draw substantially from vendor and commercial cost-guide sources and should be validated with local turnkey quotes. State warehouse licensing, bonding and indemnity provisions vary and change; verify against the current state statute. Programme terms are set by USDA and SBA and are periodically revised; confirm current requirements with the participating lender. This is not legal, tax or lending advice. Last updated: August 6, 2026.