The Feasibility Study Consultant's Role in Brewery, Winery and Distillery Feasibility Studies

A pint sold across a taproom bar returns roughly five to eight times the revenue per barrel of the same beer sold to a distributor. In 2025 the most distribution-dependent segment of craft brewing — microbreweries — fell 8.9% in production and 4.4% in count, while brewpubs fell 1.7%. Those two facts together overturn thirty years of received wisdom about how a craft brewery is supposed to grow, and any feasibility model still treating the taproom as a marketing channel rather than the business is modelling the wrong company.

Three categories contracting, in three different ways

Craft beer is in a managed correction. Openings and closures are both falling and the industry is approaching a new equilibrium.

Craft spirits is in a sharper, later contraction that mirrors beer's trajectory with a lag — and is currently falling faster than beer ever did in a single year.

Wine is in a structural, demographic decline that Silicon Valley Bank's own analyst declines to describe as cyclical.

A study that treats these as one market has already made an error, and the financing routes, the risk profile and the failure modes differ meaningfully between them.

Craft beer in 2026

The counts. Per the Brewers Association's 2025 Annual Craft Brewing Industry Production Report, updated 29 May 2026, operating US craft breweries fell to 9,578 in 2025, a 2.9% net decline. Openings dropped sharply to 300, from 518 in 2024. Closures fell to 481, from 591.

That is the second consecutive year in which closures outpaced openings — the first such run since the early 2000s. 2024 was the first year since 2005 that closures exceeded openings, at 335 openings against 399 closings.

One data-handling note that matters. The BA reports several brewery counts for 2025 depending on definition and timing: 9,269 at midyear, 9,778 in the year-end release, and 9,578 in the finalised production report. The BA itself notes the count is almost certainly overstated. Use 9,578 as the finalised figure and disclose the variance rather than picking whichever number suits the argument.

Production. Craft production fell 5.1% in 2025 to 21,856,000 barrels — the steepest non-pandemic decline on record, accelerating from 3.9% in 2024. Some BA releases cite approximately 22,034,000 barrels and a 4% decline depending on revision timing.

But craft's share went up. Because the overall US beer market fell faster, at 5.7% by volume, craft's volume share ticked up to roughly 13.3% to 13.4%. Retail dollar sales fell to approximately $27.8 billion to $28.0 billion, holding around 24.6% to 24.8% of the $113 billion US beer market.

And the dollar decline was smaller than the volume decline — 3.6% against 5.1% — because of price increases and a mix shift toward higher-revenue taproom sales. That gap is the taproom effect showing up in the national numbers.

The segment split is the finding

By production volume in 2025:

• Microbreweries: −8.9%
• Regional: −5.9%, with some releases at −4.1%
• Taprooms: −3.9%
• Brewpubs: −1.7%

By count:

• Microbreweries: −4.4%, to 1,994
• Taprooms: −2.7%, to 3,784
• Brewpubs: −2.5%, to 3,525
• Regional: −0.4%, to 275

Distribution-focused microbreweries are being hit hardest. Hospitality-forward brewpubs and taprooms are the most resilient.

And the middle tier is actively de-listing craft. The National Beer Wholesalers Association's Beer Purchasers' Index showed craft at 15 in June 2025 — far below the 50 expansion threshold and down from 27 a year earlier — representing more than three consecutive years of contraction.

In the BA's 2025 midyear survey, taprooms and brewpubs outpaced distribution-focused peers by one to two points.

So a projection that assumes distributor uptake is assuming something the distributor data says is not happening.

The demand picture

Total US beer taxable removals through October 2025 reached 119.57 million barrels, down 5.0% year to date.

Gallup's Consumption Habits survey, conducted 7 to 21 July 2025, found the share of US adults who consume alcohol had fallen to 54% — "the lowest by one percentage point in Gallup's nearly 90-year trend," against a prior low of 55% in 1958. Average drinks per week fell to 2.8, the lowest Gallup has recorded since 1996.

Four forces are converging: generational moderation, cannabis substitution, non-alcoholic alternatives, and GLP-1 medications.

On GLP-1s, the evidence is real and the magnitude is debated. KFF found approximately 1 in 8 US adults, 12%, had used a GLP-1 drug as of May 2024. Peer-reviewed meta-analyses in 2025, including one published in eClinicalMedicine on 14 November 2025, confirm that GLP-1 receptor agonists reduce alcohol consumption and craving.

And the category effect is uneven. An EY-Parthenon consumer survey in March 2025 found that among drinkers who cut back, wine saw the steepest decline at 52% reducing, then beer at 43% and spirits at 40%.

The honest framing for a feasibility study: GLP-1s do not create the moderation trend, they accelerate it — and they disproportionately affect the higher-income, health-conscious consumers who drive premium craft sales.

Non-alcoholic is the one category craft is winning

This is genuinely counterintuitive and it is worth stating plainly.

Per the Brewers Association's State of Non-Alc: "In 2025, craft made up 31% of NA sales volume and 36% of NA dollar sales… compare that to craft's roughly 13% share of beer overall."

National craft NA volume grew 21% year over year, with the Mountain Division posting 27% dollar growth. Dedicated NA brewers — Athletic Brewing, Best Day Brewing — plus craft line extensions are driving it.

Craft over-indexes in non-alcoholic by more than two to one against its share of beer overall. In a contracting market that is the single clearest growth pocket available.

Two caveats for the model. 40% of BA survey respondents felt craft NA has staying power against 31% who did not. And NA production carries real formulation and capital complexity — some breweries contract it out entirely rather than build the capability, and a feasibility study should cost the chosen route explicitly.

The closures are not anecdotal

2025 and 2026 saw a substantial roll call: Iron Hill Brewery in bankruptcy in late 2025; 21st Amendment Brewery announcing wind-down in 2025; Rogue Ales and Spirits filing Chapter 7 in November 2025; Bosque Brewing Chapter 11 in October 2025; Strike Brewing and Dissent Craft Brewing liquidating; Olfactory Brewing Chapter 7 in March 2026; Memphis Made Chapter 11 in August 2025; Goodwood Brewing and Spirits Chapter 7 in June 2026; 4 by 4 Brewing Chapter 11 in January 2026.

And one cautionary case worth naming: 21 Locks Brewing opened in May 2025 and closed in January 2026 — eight months, and a straightforward undercapitalisation failure.

Input costs and tariffs

Hops. The USDA National Hop Report put the US average hop price at $5.38 per pound in 2025, up 26 cents year over year even as acreage fell 7%. US hop production was 87.1 million pounds in 2024, down 16%.

Packaging is the bigger shock. Aluminium and steel tariffs of 25%, later raised to 50% and effective March 2025, drove can costs up. Empty aluminium cans and canned beer were added to the derivative tariff list.

Aluminium is the single largest input cost in American beer manufacturing — more than 74% of beer is packaged in aluminium, and roughly 30% of US aluminium is imported, mainly from Canada.

Brewers reported can cost increases ranging from 8% to more than 30%, with Midwest aluminium around $4,800 per metric ton, an all-time high.

And steel tariffs raised the cost of tanks, fermenters, brewhouses and kegs — directly inflating the equipment line in every capital budget.

Wine in 2026

Silicon Valley Bank's State of the US Wine Industry 2026, released 15 January 2026 and authored by Rob McMillan, estimated 2025 US wine sales at approximately 329 million cases — down from 335.9 million in 2024 and 410 million in 2019 — worth approximately $74.3 billion, down from $75.5 billion.

McMillan's forecast, verbatim: "We expect the decline in total market demand to improve in 2026, with the market bottoming in 2027 through 2028 before returning to modest growth rates" — reaching pre-COVID levels only around 2040.

And his caution: "I would caution believing anyone who suggests that 2026 will bring growth. That is just unsupported hope. The math isn't there."

The bifurcation

From a survey of 555 US wineries conducted in October 2025:

• Top-quartile wineries reported 8% sales growth and 11.9% operating income.
• Bottom-quartile wineries saw a 10.2% sales decline and a negative 10.5% operating margin.

Winners use high-touch direct-to-consumer, disciplined pricing and experiential engagement. Losers entered the year with weak liquidity.

That spread — from plus 11.9% to minus 10.5% operating margin within one industry in one year — is what a feasibility study has to place a specific project inside.

Oversupply, and why it is structural

SVB frames the oversupply as both cyclical and structural, leaning structural.

The US remains overplanted in most regions, producing uncontracted fruit and spot price reductions in 2026. In some cases "lowering the price to zero isn't sufficient to have all production under contract." Several regions left meaningful tonnage unharvested, and California's 2025 harvest estimate came in below 2.2 million tons.

The demographic driver — an aging, wine-focused cohort not being replaced by younger drinkers — is what makes this structural rather than a normal glut.

The direct-to-consumer channel contracted, badly

The 2026 Direct-to-Consumer Wine Shipping Report, from Sovos ShipCompliant and WineBusiness Analytics and published 27 January 2026, reported the worst year since tracking began in 2010.

The DtC channel contracted by 967,000 cases and more than $230 million in 2025 — a 15% drop in volume and a 6% decrease in value — even as the average price per bottle rose 11%.

Sovos' Alex Koral: "What happened in DtC shipping in 2025 wasn't subtle or selective—it was systemic."

That combination deserves attention because it looks like premiumisation and is not. Value held up only because higher prices offset far fewer cases — not because demand grew. A model reading rising average bottle price as evidence of a strengthening consumer has read it backwards.

Mid-year data put the average bottle shipped at $52.68, with California, Texas, Washington, Florida and New York the top destination states.

And SVB's structural point: passive demand has ended. Automatic club growth, distributor pull and walk-in visitation no longer arrive on their own. Tasting room conversion now depends on narrative and experience quality, and club attrition is rising as the core consumer ages out.

Craft spirits in 2026

The distiller count collapsed. The ACSA 2025 Craft Spirits Data Project, produced with Park Street and briefed on 21 October 2025 covering full-year 2024, reported the number of active craft distillers falling 25.6% to 2,282 as of August 2025, from 3,069 a year earlier — a loss of 787 producers.

ACSA notes that an updated research methodology accounts for part of the drop, so the true operating-business decline is real but somewhat smaller than the headline implies. It was nonetheless the second consecutive year of decline.

California was hit hardest, down 45% to 207 from 379. Next largest states: New York 159, Pennsylvania 149, Texas 126, Washington 108.

Volume and value. US craft spirits volume reached 12.7 million nine-litre cases in 2024, a growth rate of negative 6.1%; value was $7.6 billion, negative 3.3%. Craft's share of total US spirits fell to approximately 4.5% by volume and 7.5% by value.

Craft spirits exports plunged 20.7% to 142,000 cases.

And investment turned down for the first time. Average investment per producer fell to $288,900 in 2024 from $310,400, with total sector investment falling to $811 million from $885 million. Full-time employment fell to 28,628 from 29,373 — the first decline since the pandemic.

Is craft spirits following beer? Yes, with a lag — and currently falling faster. A 25.6% single-year distiller count decline is sharper than anything craft beer experienced in one year, which suggests the spirits shakeout may be more brutal but shorter.

The wider spirits picture

DISCUS reported total US spirits supplier sales of $36.4 billion in 2025, down 2.2%, while volumes rose 1.9% to 318.1 million nine-litre cases. Spirits held its market share lead over beer and wine.

Premiumisation is on pause. In the 2024 data, super-premium spirits fell 5.6% in revenue and 4.8% in volume while value spirits grew 3.5% and 4.6%. 2024 marked DISCUS's first annual revenue decline since it began briefings in 2004. High-end and super-premium still account for approximately 59% of revenue.

RTDs are the growth engine craft is largely missing

Spirits-based ready-to-drink and premixed cocktails reached $3.8 billion in 2025, up 16.4%, and have more than doubled market share since 2021 — up 11 points in 2025 — while malt-based seltzers fell 14 points.

This is the clearest growth opportunity in spirits. But most craft distillers lack the canning lines and working capital to participate at scale, which is a genuine strategic finding rather than an aspiration to write into a projection.

Aging inventory is the defining feasibility risk

Whiskey aging two to four years or more ties up capital in barrels that generate no revenue until bottled.

Lenders treat aging inventory conservatively — it is illiquid, single-purpose collateral.

Undercapitalised distillers that sold young or contract-distilled to survive have suffered. Goodwood Brewing and Spirits' Chapter 7 in June 2026 illustrates the combined beer-and-spirits working capital squeeze.

A distillery model that does not show the multi-year cash sink explicitly, month by month, has concealed the risk that actually kills these businesses.

The EU tariff position needs checking today

American whiskey's largest export market is the EU, and the position has moved repeatedly.

The 2018 to 2021 retaliatory tariff of 25% cut exports approximately 20%, from $552 million to $440 million. After suspension, exports surged roughly 60% to $699 million in 2024.

A threatened 30% tariff, originally set for 5 August 2025, was suspended to 5 February 2026, then extended again to 6 August 2026 under EU Commission Implementing Regulation 2026/295. A threatened 50% tariff dated 1 April 2025 was never imposed. And the Supreme Court ruled the IEEPA tariffs unlawful on 20 February 2026, in a 6-3 decision.

That 6 August 2026 date is current as of writing and the position should be verified before any export revenue is modelled. Whiskey export projections remain fundamentally uncertain and should be stress-tested against tariff snap-back regardless of the current status.

Financing

The SBA position, and an honest data gap

Programme scale. The SBA approved 70,242 7(a) loans totalling $31.1 billion in FY2024. The portfolio-average annualised default rate ran approximately 5.4% across 312,857 active loans in the first half of FY2026 per Lumos Data, while lifetime charge-off rates against fully resolved loans run approximately 15.4% to 15.8% portfolio-wide per PeerSense.

Those two figures are not contradictory — they use different denominators, and any study quoting default risk must state the basis and vintage.

On beverage-specific data, an honest limitation. Breweries at NAICS 312120, wineries at 312130 and distilleries at 312140 are individually tracked in SBA loan disclosure data, but per-NAICS loan counts, volumes and charge-off rates for these three codes sit behind paid analytics products.

The closest fully verified alcohol-adjacent proxy is Grape Vineyards at NAICS 111332: 123 SBA loans totalling $67.3 million, average loan $547,000, 68 active lenders, a 0.8% historical default rate, an 84% 7(a) to 16% 504 split and an average term of 168 months.

That 0.8% figure should not be quoted as the brewery, winery or distillery number. It is grape growing, not beverage manufacturing, and it is directional only.

What can be said with confidence: manufacturing under NAICS 31 to 33 is classified as below-average default risk, and craft beverage manufacturing appears to perform better than food-service comparators — food and beverage stores under NAICS 445 run approximately 16.2% lifetime charge-off, and restaurants 10% to 15%. Small samples and single-purpose collateral warrant caution.

Who lends

Live Oak Bank is the clear market leader. It launched a dedicated Wine and Craft Beverage lending division in January 2015, financing wineries, vineyards, breweries and distilleries, is an SBA Preferred Lender, and was the largest US SBA lender overall in calendar 2025 at $2.68 billion. On brewery lender rate tables it shows the lowest spread among brewery lenders at 1.87 over Prime.

Other active SBA lenders: Huntington National Bank, Newtek Bank, ReadyCap Lending, Celtic Bank, Byline Bank and Zions Bank. For wineries specifically: Wells Fargo, Columbia Bank and Community West Bank, with TMC Financing and Bay Area Development Company named as CDCs specialising in SBA 504 winery loans.

What SOP 50 10 8 changed

Effective 1 June 2025:

• The 7(a) Small Loan ceiling cut from $500,000 back to $350,000
• 100% US citizen or lawful permanent resident ownership required, up from 51%
• A 10% minimum equity injection restored for startups and changes of ownership
• Minimum SBSS score raised from 155 to 165
• Stricter special-purpose property appraisal requirements — USPAP compliance and experienced real estate appraisers
• The $250,000 threshold for outside business valuations reaffirmed

And the provision that matters most here: SOP 50 10 8 requires or strongly indicates an independent feasibility study whenever historical performance cannot itself demonstrate repayment ability — startups under two years, complete changes of ownership, ground-up construction, substantial expansions, and special-purpose or limited-market properties.

Breweries, wineries and distilleries typically fall into one or more of those categories.

Are they special-purpose property?

In practice, yes. A brewhouse or winery is a single-use, limited-market facility, which triggers the stricter appraisal and feasibility treatment.

That classification is the single most important reason a professional feasibility study is now central to craft beverage financing, rather than a document commissioned reluctantly.

One programme change worth acting on

Effective 1 October 2025, the SBA waived the upfront guarantee fee for qualifying small manufacturers under NAICS 31 to 33 on loans up to $950,000.

All three beverage codes sit within NAICS 31 to 33. For a project financing under $950,000 — which covers a substantial share of nano, micro and brewpub projects — that is a direct and material saving.

USDA

Business and Industry. For FY2026, USDA set the B&I guarantee at 85% for applications under $5 million. Loans typically run $200,000 to $5 million with an average around $3 million, up to $25 million standard and $40 million for rural cooperatives processing value-added commodities. Eligibility requires a rural location, generally outside cities of 50,000 or more. The initial guarantee fee is 2% with an annual renewal fee of approximately 0.5%.

ERS research found B&I recipients are less likely to fail than comparable non-recipients — a useful point when a rural sponsor is weighing the added process.

REAP grants are paused. REAP remains authorised and funded for FY2026, but the grant portion is not accepting applications. USDA announced on 30 June 2025 that it would delay the FY2026 grant window, originally 1 July to 30 September 2025, due to a backlog. It anticipated reopening on 1 October 2025 but on 31 March 2026 announced it would instead issue new regulations, with no new grant applications accepted in the interim.

REAP guaranteed loans remain available year round. Breweries and distilleries can use REAP for energy efficiency and renewable projects where they meet rural and small business size standards — but a feasibility model should not assume grant funds in 2026.

Value-Added Producer Grants help agricultural producers process and market value-added products. Wineries and cideries that grow their own fruit can qualify — turning grapes or apples into wine or cider is a classic value-added activity. Breweries and distilleries growing their own grain may also qualify.

This is producer-tied. A distillery buying commodity grain generally does not qualify; an estate winery or farm distillery can. That distinction is worth establishing early because it changes the available capital stack.

Collateral

Brewhouse and tank collateral is valued conservatively because it is single purpose. Lenders discount used brewing and distilling equipment heavily on a forced-liquidation basis.

Best practice separates capital expenditure financing — SBA or equipment loans against the hard assets — from equity and working capital for taproom buildout and the operating ramp. Conflating them is how a project ends up fully built and unable to trade.

Excise tax: the one stable variable

The Craft Beverage Modernization Act rates were made permanent in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 and are not subject to expiry.

Beer: $3.50 per barrel on the first 60,000 barrels for domestic brewers producing under 2 million barrels a year; $16 per barrel on the next barrels up to 6 million; $18 per barrel above 6 million.

Wine: a tiered credit — $1.00 per gallon on the first 30,000 gallons, $0.90 on the next 100,000, and $0.535 on the next 620,000, covering the first 750,000 gallons in total.

Spirits: $2.70 per proof gallon on the first 100,000 proof gallons; $13.34 on the next 22,130,000; $13.50 above that.

Worth stating because it de-risks a line most projections treat nervously: had CBMA not been made permanent, spirits rates would have reverted — roughly a 400% increase on the low tier.

Permitting, three-tier and direct-to-consumer

TTB permitting. A federal Brewer's Notice, Distilled Spirits Plant permit or winery basic permit is required before production. Timelines historically run 60 to 120 days for a Brewer's Notice, and a 2025 to 2026 TTB processing slowdown tied to staffing and reduced operations should be confirmed at the time of application. Feasibility timelines should assume a conservative permitting window and sequence state manufacturing and retail licences accordingly.

Three-tier and franchise law. The three-tier system still governs most volume, but self-distribution rules vary widely by state — and franchise laws in many states make it extremely difficult to leave a distributor once signed.

That is a critical and frequently unexamined risk for any distribution-dependent model. A feasibility study must map the specific state's self-distribution allowance, franchise law exposure and taproom or on-premise privileges, because those three facts determine which business model is even available.

Direct-to-consumer differs sharply by category. Wine DtC shipping is broadly legal, in 45 or more states following Granholm v. Heald in 2005. Beer and spirits DtC remains far more restricted, permitted in only a handful of states.

Which means a beer or spirits project cannot assume a DtC revenue line the way a winery can. In March 2026 Sovos ShipCompliant and the Brewers Association released survey data showing strong support for expanded DtC beer laws, and California's AB 1246 in 2025 extended DtC allowances for distillers with out-of-state provisions — but liberalisation is gradual and state-specific, and belongs in a model as upside rather than base case.

Health warnings. In January 2025 the US Surgeon General issued an advisory on alcohol and cancer risk, proposing updated warning labels. The 2025 to 2030 Dietary Guidelines, released in January 2026, maintained moderation recommendations. These create reputational and demand risk but no mandated label change as of writing.

Project economics

Capital cost

Brewery rules of thumb for 2026:

• Nano-brewery, 100 to 500 barrels a year on a 1 to 3 barrel system: roughly $50,000 to $300,000
• Production microbrewery with a 10 to 15 barrel system and taproom: commonly $730,000 to $1.2 million all-in including taproom buildout and working capital
• Brewpub: $500,000 to $1.5 million
• Regional: $2 million to $10 million and above

A 3 to 10 barrel system runs $100,000 to $250,000; a 10 barrel brewhouse alone approximately $150,000. Metal-building construction can save $120,000 to $300,000 on a 6,000 square foot facility against conventional construction.

The recurring failure mode across every source: undercapitalisation by 40% to 60% of actual need, and overbuying tank capacity before demand is validated.

On winery and distillery capital, an honest limitation. Authoritative single-source 2026 figures for per-ton-crush winery cost and standardised distillery still and warehouse cost are not consistently published. Those line items should be built from project-specific vendor quotes rather than industry rules of thumb, and any generic per-case or per-ton figure treated as directional only.

What can be said structurally: winery capital scales with tons crushed and cases produced and includes crush pad, tanks, a barrel programme and usually a tasting room — with barrel inventory and multi-vintage aging as major working capital sinks, tying up cash in inventory that may not sell for two to four years. Distillery capital includes the still, warehouse and, most importantly, barrel inventory aging for years before revenue.

The channel margin arithmetic

The Brewers Association cites average taproom gross revenue of $350 to $550 per barrel on-premise.

Independent analysis puts a taproom pint at roughly five to eight times the revenue per barrel of the same beer sold to a distributor — an $8 taproom pint at around 75% gross margin against roughly 30% of that revenue per ounce in a distributor keg.

Gross margin by channel:

• Taproom and on-premise: highest, approximately 70% to 75% and above
• Self-distribution: middle — retains more margin than wholesale but consumes labour and logistics
• Wholesale distribution: lowest per unit, often 30% or less of taproom revenue per ounce after distributor and retailer margins
• Packaged retail off-premise: thin and highly competitive, pressured by retailers rationalising craft shelf space

That five-to-eight-times gap is the mathematical core of the taproom conclusion, and it is why break-even volume is dramatically lower for a taproom-dominant model than a distribution one.

Capacity utilisation

The classic feasibility error is projecting high utilisation in year one.

Realistic assumptions: year one approximately 30% to 40% of nameplate capacity; year three 55% to 70%; stabilisation in year four or five at 75% to 85%.

One financial model of a 10 barrel system targeted only approximately 312 barrels — 40,000 pints — in year one, which illustrates how far below nameplate a realistic first year sits.

Quantifying demand

For a taproom, demand is a trade area and visitation problem — population within a drive time radius, daypart traffic, tourism, competitive density and capture rate. Methodologically closer to a restaurant than to a manufacturer.

For a distribution brand, demand is a shelf space and velocity problem — distributor willingness, chain authorisations and turns per SKU, in a market where the Beer Purchasers' Index shows distributors actively de-listing craft.

Those require fundamentally different methodologies, and a study that applies one to the other has answered the wrong question.

Where craft beverage projects fail

Across the 2025 and 2026 closures the causes cluster tightly:

• Undercapitalisation. 21 Locks opened and closed within eight months.
• Over-reliance on distribution as the middle tier de-lists craft — Rogue and 21st Amendment.
• Large fixed-footprint hospitality overhead in a cooling market — Iron Hill.
• Combined beer and spirits working capital strain — Goodwood.

Rising labour, rent and packaging costs against falling traffic were cited almost universally.

The common projection errors:

• Overstating year-one capacity utilisation
• Assuming distribution volume the middle tier will not absorb
• Treating the taproom as a marketing cost rather than the primary revenue engine
• Underbudgeting working capital and the operating ramp
• For distillers, ignoring the multi-year aging capital sink
• Baking in REAP grant funds that are paused
• Assuming export revenue exposed to tariff snap-back

On scale and viability, the data cuts against grow-into-distribution as a default strategy. Small taproom-focused breweries are the most resilient; mid-size distribution-dependent microbreweries the most vulnerable. Scale helps only when paired with genuine brand strength — Garage Beer and Tivoli's Outlaw both grew into the top 50 in 2025.

And a corrective worth including. The contraction is real but not universal: 39% of breweries still grew production in 2025, and among sub-1,000 barrel breweries 50% grew against 43% declining. The failure is concentrated in a specific business model rather than distributed across the sector.

What a lender is reading for

• Which channel carries the revenue? Taproom, self-distribution or wholesale — because a barrel of taproom revenue is worth five to eight times a barrel of distribution revenue, and the coverage should be attributed accordingly.
• What utilisation is assumed in year one? Anything above 40% of nameplate needs justifying.
• Is the working capital sized for the ramp? Separately from the equipment financing.
• What does state law actually permit? Self-distribution, franchise law exposure, taproom privileges and DtC eligibility by category.
• For distillers, where does the aging inventory sit in the cash flow? Month by month, not as a footnote.
• Is grant funding assumed? REAP grants are paused and should not appear in a base case.
• Is export revenue exposed to tariffs? And has it been stress-tested against reinstatement.
• Does the equity injection work? 10% minimum under SOP 50 10 8.

Frequently asked questions

Sources

• Brewers Association — 2025 Annual Craft Brewing Industry Production Report, updated 29 May 2026; 2024 and 2025 Year in Beer releases; 2025 midyear survey; The State of Non-Alc.
• National Beer Wholesalers Association Beer Purchasers' Index, 2025.
• Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau taxable removals data, 2025.
• Gallup Consumption Habits survey, conducted 7 to 21 July 2025.
• Kaiser Family Foundation GLP-1 usage data, May 2024; eClinicalMedicine meta-analysis, 14 November 2025; EY-Parthenon GLP-1 Consumer Survey, March 2025.
• USDA National Hop Report, 2025.
• Silicon Valley Bank, State of the US Wine Industry 2026, released 15 January 2026, authored by Rob McMillan, including a survey of 555 US wineries conducted October 2025.
• Sovos ShipCompliant and WineBusiness Analytics, 2026 Direct-to-Consumer Wine Shipping Report, 27 January 2026.
• American Craft Spirits Association and Park Street, 2025 Craft Spirits Data Project, economic briefing 21 October 2025.
• Distilled Spirits Council annual economic briefings, 2024 and 2025.
• EU Commission Implementing Regulation 2026/295; US Supreme Court ruling on IEEPA tariffs, 20 February 2026.
• SBA Standard Operating Procedure 50 10 8, effective 1 June 2025; SBA manufacturer fee waiver effective 1 October 2025.
• SBA loan disclosure data as analysed by Lumos Data and PeerSense.
• USDA Rural Development — Business and Industry Guaranteed Loan Program FY2026 guarantee notice; Rural Energy for America Program announcements of 30 June 2025 and 31 March 2026; Value-Added Producer Grants; USDA Economic Research Service B&I outcome research.
• Craft Beverage Modernization Act rates as made permanent by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021.
• Granholm v. Heald, 2005; California AB 1246, 2025.
• US Surgeon General advisory on alcohol and cancer risk, January 2025; 2025 to 2030 Dietary Guidelines, January 2026.

Prepared by feasibility-study-consultant.com. Brewers Association brewery counts for 2025 vary between releases — 9,269 at midyear, 9,778 at year-end and 9,578 in the finalised production report, with the BA noting the count is likely overstated; 9,578 is used here. Production figures similarly vary by revision timing. The ACSA craft distiller decline is partly attributable to a revised counting methodology. Per-NAICS SBA loan and charge-off data for breweries, wineries and distilleries sits behind paid analytics products and no beverage-specific default rate is asserted here; the Grape Vineyards proxy cited is grape growing rather than beverage manufacturing and is directional only. Portfolio default measures use different denominators and both bases are stated. Winery per-ton-crush and distillery still and warehouse capital figures are not consistently published and should be developed from project-specific vendor quotes. Tariff positions were moving at the time of writing, including an EU suspension running to 6 August 2026, and should be verified before any export assumption is relied upon. Capital cost and channel margin figures draw partly from industry and vendor sources. Programme terms are set by SBA and USDA and are periodically revised; confirm current requirements with the participating lender. This is not legal, tax or lending advice. Last updated: August 6, 2026.